Everything Is Permitted? People Intuitively Judge Immorality as Representative of Atheists by Gervais, Will M.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology
4-9-2014
Everything Is Permitted? People Intuitively Judge
Immorality as Representative of Atheists
Will M. Gervais
University of Kentucky, will.gervais@uky.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://uknowledge.uky.edu/psychology_facpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Repository Citation
Gervais, Will M., "Everything Is Permitted? People Intuitively Judge Immorality as Representative of Atheists" (2014). Psychology
Faculty Publications. Paper 124.
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/psychology_facpub/124
Everything Is Permitted? People Intuitively Judge
Immorality as Representative of Atheists
Will M. Gervais*
University of Kentucky, Department of Psychology, Lexington, Kentucky, United States of America
Abstract
Scientific research yields inconsistent and contradictory evidence relating religion to moral judgments and outcomes, yet
most people on earth nonetheless view belief in God (or gods) as central to morality, and many view atheists with suspicion
and scorn. To evaluate intuitions regarding a causal link between religion and morality, this paper tested intuitive moral
judgments of atheists and other groups. Across five experiments (N = 1,152), American participants intuitively judged a wide
variety of immoral acts (e.g., serial murder, consensual incest, necrobestiality, cannibalism) as representative of atheists, but
not of eleven other religious, ethnic, and cultural groups. Even atheist participants judged immoral acts as more
representative of atheists than of other groups. These findings demonstrate a prevalent intuition that belief in God serves a
necessary function in inhibiting immoral conduct, and may help explain persistent negative perceptions of atheists.
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Introduction
Without God and the future life? It means everything is
permitted now, one can do anything?
-Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov
If you learn about an individual’s moral or immoral conduct,
what else can you infer about that person’s beliefs? For instance, if
you learn that an individual kills homeless people for fun, or has
consumed human flesh, what else might you guess about him or
her? The present experiments evaluate the degree to which people
perceive religious belief as a necessary component of morality. To
individuals who intuitively assume that morality primarily arises
from religion, another person’s moral behavior may be seen as
diagnostic of his or her religious beliefs—or lack thereof. Across
experiments, the present paper tested the degree to which immoral
behavior is intuitively seen as a signal of religious disbelief.
Religion and Morality: Reality and Perception
Is religion the bedrock of morality? On the one hand, religion is
linked to a variety of positive outcomes, including prosocial
behavior [1–4], volunteerism [5], honesty [6–7], and an ability to
resist temptation [8–9]. Religions may have been instrumental in
the development of moral communities [10] that foster cooper-
ation. On the other hand, moral judgments rely heavily on
intuitions that emerge early in development [11] and may be
shared with close primate relatives [11–15]. These moral intuitions
may suggest the operation of a universal moral grammar [16] that
is robust across differences in religion [17–18].
Although scientific opinion on the relationship between religion
and morality is somewhat ambiguous, popular opinion seemingly
is not. Most Americans report that belief in God is an integral
component of morality, a sentiment echoed at least as strongly in
most countries worldwide [19]. A perceived intimate connection
between religion and morality may engender widespread reactions
of exclusion [20], distrust [21–24], and disgust [25] towards
atheists around the world.
An assumed causal relationship between religion and morality
has the potential to influence the intuitive assumptions that often
underlie stereotyping and prejudice. People readily form intuitive
representations of a person’s likely group memberships given only
minimal information about that person [26]. To the extent that
people view morality as deriving from religious belief, then
information about a person’s moral conduct may be intuitively
viewed as diagnostic of that person’s religious beliefs. In other
words, to an observer who thinks that religion enables people to
inhibit immoral behavior, learning that an agent engages in
immoral behavior may be sufficient to lead the observer to
intuitively infer that the agent is not religious. Thus, reactions to
descriptions of immoral behavior can shed light on people’s
intuitions regarding the role of religious belief in morality.
An intuitive connection between religion and morality may also
help explain the prevalence of negative perceptions of atheists.
Atheists are routinely excluded in the U.S.A. [20]. In the context
of many classic approaches to prejudice and stereotyping, this is a
puzzling form of antipathy [21,23]. Atheists do not constitute a
cohesive or powerful group (if, indeed, they can even meaningfully
be thought of as a group), and classic intergroup dynamics do not
appear to adequately explain negative perceptions of atheists. In
addition, perceptions of warmth and competence do not explain
why atheists are perceived even more negatively than other groups
similar in this regard [23]. Initial research highlights distrust as one
key component in anti-atheist prejudice [22–23,27]. The present
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research, in addition to exploring intuitive perceptions of a
religion-morality link, offers to broaden this investigation of
distrust of atheists to consider the broader question of whether
atheists are distrusted in part because people intuitively assume
that atheists in some way lack a perceived necessary component of
morality: religious belief.
General Method
The present experiments evaluated intuitive perceptions of a
causal link between religion and morality by utilizing the
representativeness heuristic [26], a mental shortcut that biases
people’s probability judgments. In a classic problem illustrating
this heuristic, participants are given a description of Linda, a
politically active, single, liberal woman who cares deeply about
social justice and asked whether it is more probable that Linda is
A) a bank teller, or B) a bank teller who is active in the feminist
movement. Although the first option is necessarily the correct
answer (feminist bank tellers being only a subset of bank tellers in
general), most people commit a conjunction error: that is, they
erroneously pick the latter option because they intuitively judge
that the description (single, liberal, politically active) is represen-
tative of the potential group membership (feminist) implied in the
question. However, if participants are instead given a potential
group membership that does not fit the description (e.g., if Linda
could be a bank teller who is an avid big game hunter), there is less
intuitive pull to commit a conjunction error (the Online
Supplement includes an empirical demonstration of this differ-
ence). Thus, by independently manipulating the contents of the
description and the potential group membership implied in the
question, researchers can use the rates of conjunction errors for
different targets as an index of the degree to which a given
description is intuitively viewed as representative of different
groups of people [23].
In five experiments, I presented participants with a description
of someone engaging in an action that is often viewed as immoral.
Then, between participants, I varied the potential groups to which
the person might belong to test the degree to which the immoral
act was seen as representative of different groups of people
(schematically represented in Figure 1). All five experiments drew
samples from adults in the U.S.A. on Amazon Mechanical Turk,
an online labor market frequently and productively used in social
science research [28–29]. Across experiments, I tested moral
perceptions of atheists across eight different moral transgressions
varying greatly in severity, ranging from relative innocuous (e.g.,
cheating at cards) to more unconventional (e.g., incest) and even
severe (serial murder). In addition, throughout experiments
perceptions of atheists were compared to perceptions of a variety
of other targets, including Christians, Jewish people, Muslims,
Hindus, Buddhists, Whites, Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, Native
Americans, and gay men. These experiments therefore present a
thorough investigation of intuitive perceptions of a religion-
morality link that includes various domains of morality [30], and
contrasts atheists to many other religious, ethnic, and cultural
outgroups.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 presented participants with a description of a
person engaging in clearly and unambiguously immoral behavior:
the character tortures animals as a child and, as an adult, abducts,
kills, and dismembers five homeless people before burying them in
his basement. Crucially, Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that
participants would intuitively find a description of an animal
torturer and serial murderer to be more representative of atheists
than of a variety of different religious groups.
Participants
Two hundred thirty seven American adults from Mechanical
Turk participated in Experiment 1. The participants represented a
wide variety of religious backgrounds (full demographics for all
experiments are presented in the supporting information: Table S1
and Figure S1 in File S1). I aimed to recruit at least 30 participants
per cell, and deliberately oversampled to meet this goal. All sample
size decisions were made a priori. Three participants failed an
Instrumental Manipulation Check [31] and were excluded before
any analyses were conducted.
Procedure
All research was approved by the University of Kentucky Office
of Research Integrity. Participants first completed an IRB-
approved online consent procedure. Participants read a consent
form. After reading the form and having an opportunity to email
with any questions, participants checked a box to confirm that
they were at least 18 years old, had read and understood the
consent form, and agreed to participate. After giving digital
consent, participants proceeded to the main survey.
In the main survey, participants were first presented with the
following description of a moral transgressor:
When Dax was young, he began inflicting harm on animals. It started
with just pulling the wings off flies, but eventually progressed to torturing
squirrels and stray cats in his neighborhood.
As an adult, Dax found that he did not get much thrill from harming
animals, so he began hurting people instead. He has killed 5 homeless
people that he abducted from poor neighborhoods in his home city. Their
dismembered bodies are currently buried in his basement.
Following this description, participants were asked whether it is
more probable that the character is A) a teacher, or B) a teacher
who XXXXXX, with XXXXXX varied between subjects.
XXXXXX was either ‘‘does not believe in God’’ (N = 35), ‘‘is a
Buddhist’’ (N = 39), ‘‘is a Christian’’ (N = 38), ‘‘is a Hindu’’
(N = 51), ‘‘is Jewish’’ (N = 44), or ‘‘is a Muslim’’ (N = 30).
Experiment 1 referred to the atheist target merely as someone
who does not believe in God to mitigate kneejerk negative
reactions to the term ‘‘atheist.’’ In the Buddhist, Hindu, and
Muslim conditions, the villain was referred to as ‘‘a man’’ rather
than ‘‘Dax.’’ (See, however, Experiment 5 and a pilot study in the
Online Supplement demonstrating that effects do not seem to be
affected by this name difference).
Immediately following the conjunction question, participants
had one additional item as an Instrumental Manipulation Check
[31] to exclude participants not paying attention to directions.
This item included a question about US Presidents, with a drop
down menu providing several response choices. However, in the
instructions for this item, participants were told to skip the
question without leaving a response.
Next, participants proceeded to a different screen that included
four syllogistic reasoning problems. These items were included to
better conceal the true nature of the conjunction task as merely
one in a series of logic puzzles. It should be noted that because the
distractor items followed the primary measure of interest in the
study, they could not have affected responses. Rather, they were
included to reduce the (already slight) risk that performing a task
measuring perceptions of a religion-morality link might create
Immorality Judged Representative of Atheists
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social desirability pressures that would compromise participants’
own self-reported religious demographics.
Finally, participants completed a series of demographic
measures. Participants provided information about age, gender,
ethnicity, and religious affiliation, as well as measures of belief in
God, political attitudes, and subjective socioeconomic status.
Participants rated belief in God, from 0 (God definitely does not
exist) to 100 (God definitely exists). Participants rated political
attitudes on a dropdown menu, including options Very Liberal,
Liberal, Slightly Liberal, Moderate, Slightly Conservative, Con-
servative, Very Conservative. These responses were coded
numerically (1 = Very Liberal, 7 = Very Conservative). For sub-
jective socioeconomic status [32], participants rated their own
perceived status on a ladder (from 0–10), relative to the people in
the USA who are the worst off (the bottom of the ladder, 0) and
the people in the USA who are the best off (the top of the ladder,
10). Finally, participants entered their state of residence and
current zip code before being redirected to an online debriefing
with instructions on how to redeem their Mechanical Turk
payments.
Results
All analyses were performed in R [33]. Participants were
significantly more likely to commit a conjunction error (i.e.,
picking the ‘‘teacher and XXXXXX’’ option) for targets who do
not believe in God (48.6% errors) than for Buddhist (2.6%),
Christian (21.1%), Hindu (5.9%), Jewish (2.3%), or Muslim
(10.0%) targets, see Figure 2a (Table 1 presents logistic regression
results for Experiments 1–3). Participants viewed animal torture
and serial murder as representative of atheists, but not of various
religious groups.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that one particularly vivid example
of immorality—serial murder—is seen as representative of atheists.
Subsequent studies relied on widely studied examples of people’s
moral intuitions, drawing upon examples from the work of Haidt
and other Moral Foundations Theory researchers [30,34].
Experiment 2
Murder presents a strong and clear example of immorality. Yet
people often intuitively find other acts immoral even if the acts do
not involve harm to others [34]. Experiment 2 followed the
procedure of Experiment 1, and tested whether one such
seemingly victimless moral violation—consensual incest—was
similarly judged as more representative of atheists than of other
groups.
Participants
Two hundred eleven American adults from Mechanical Turk
participated in Experiment 2. The participants represented a wide
variety of religious backgrounds (full demographics for all
experiments are presented in the Online Supplement). As in
Experiment 1, I aimed to recruit at least 30 participants per cell,
and deliberately oversampled to meet this goal. All sample size
decisions were made a priori. Three participants failed an
Instrumental Manipulation Check [31] and were excluded before
any analyses were conducted.
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that used in
Experiment 1. Only the contents of the described moral violation
differed. Participants read the following description, before
completing the rest of the study exactly as in Experiment 1:
Graeme and his sister were traveling together in France. One night they
were staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decided that it would
Figure 1. Schematic summary of methods used across experiments, illustrated with the serial killer description used in Experiment
1. Note: For the Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim conditions, the character was called ‘‘a man’’ rather than ‘‘Dax.’’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092302.g001
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be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least it would be
a new experience for each of them. Graeme’s sister was already taking
birth control pills, but Graeme used a condom too, just to be safe. They
both enjoyed it, but they decided not to do it again. They keep that night
as a special secret between them, which makes them feel even closer to
each other.
Next, participants completed one of six versions of the
conjunction problem, using the same potential religious affiliations
used in Experiment 1 (sample sizes: atheist = 38, Buddhist = 38,
Christian = 39, Hindu = 31, Jewish = 31, Muslim = 34). The career
listed for the villain (i.e., the ‘‘bank teller’’ part of the original
Linda Problem) in Experiment 2 was ‘‘works in retail.’’
Results
In Experiment 2, participants intuitively judged a description of
a man engaging in consensual incest with his sister to be more
representative of people who do not believe in God (50.0% errors)
than of Buddhist (21.1%), Christian (5.1%), Hindu (9.7%), Jewish
(3.2%), or Muslim (14.7%) targets, see Figure 2b and Table 1. As
with serial murder and animal torture, participants found a
description of someone engaging in consensual incest to be more
representative of atheists than of other religious groups.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 extended Experiment 2 by testing whether
another ‘‘victimless’’ moral violation—necrobestiality—was simi-
larly seen as more representative of atheists than of other groups.
Rather than compare atheists to different religious groups,
Experiment 3 compared atheists to different ethnic groups.
Participants
Two hundred twenty one American adults from Mechanical
Turk participated in Experiment 3. The participants represented a
wide variety of religious backgrounds (full demographics for all
experiments are presented in File S1). As in Experiments 1–2, I
aimed to recruit at least 30 participants per cell, and deliberately
oversampled to meet this goal. All sample size decisions were made
a priori. Nine participants failed an Instrumental Manipulation
Check [31] and were excluded before any analyses were
conducted.
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 3 was identical to that used in
Experiments 1–2. Only the contents of the described moral
violation and the potential group memberships differed. Partici-
pants read the following description, before completing the rest of
the study exactly as in Experiments 1–2:
On the way home from work, Jack decided to stop at the butcher shop to
pick up something for dinner. He decided to roast a whole chicken. He
got home, unwrapped the chicken carcass, and decided to make love to it.
He used a condom, and fully sterilized the carcass when he was
finished. He then roasted the chicken and ate it for dinner alongside a
nice glass of Chardonnay.
Next, participants completed one of six versions of the
conjunction problem (sample sizes: atheist = 33, Asian = 43,
Black = 31, Hispanic = 38, Native American = 39, White = 37).
The career listed for the villain (i.e., the ‘‘bank teller’’ part of the
original Linda Problem) in Experiment 3 was ‘‘doctor.’’
Results
Participants intuitively judged a description of a man having
sexual intercourse with, then cooking and eating, a dead chicken
to be more representative of people who do not believe in God
(57.6% errors) than of Asian (14.0%), Black (3.2%), Hispanic
(15.8%), Native American (20.5%), or White (18.9%) targets, see
Figure 2c and Table 1. As with the case of incest presented in
Experiment 2, participants intuitively found a description of a man
having sex with and eating a dead chicken to be representative of
Figure 2. Conjunction error rates (proportion), Experiments 1–
3. A) Given a description of serial murder and animal torture,
participants were significantly more likely to commit a conjunction
error for the atheist target than for any of five religious targets. B) Given
a description of consensual incest, participants were significantly more
likely to commit a conjunction error for the atheist target than for any
of five religious targets. C) Given a description of a man having sex with,
then eating, a dead chicken, participants were significantly more likely
to commit a conjunction error for the atheist target than for any of five
ethnic targets. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the
mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092302.g002
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atheists. This effect was not apparent for any of five ethnic group
memberships.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 extended the findings of Experiments 1–3 in two
ways. First, following previous research [22–23], Experiment 4
used perceptions of gay men—another cultural outgroup fre-
quently excluded in the U.S.A.—as a strong comparison for
perceptions of atheists. Both atheists and gays have concealable
identities and are often derogated in explicitly moralistic terms.
Yet, negative perceptions of atheists and gays appear to derive
from different psychological bases [23], potentially leading moral
violations to be viewed as more representative of atheists than of
gays. Second, Experiment 4 used a broader range of moral
violations, following Moral Foundations Theory [30,34], which
posits five basic themes for moral judgment: harm, fairness, loyalty
to the ingroup, obedience to authority, and purity. In Experiment
4, participants were presented with descriptions of people violating
each of the five foundations (Harm: ridiculing an obese woman
and kicking a dog; Fairness: reneging on reciprocity norms and
cheating at cards; Ingroup: renouncing national and family ties;
Authority: disrespecting employers and police officers; Purity:
eating human flesh; full scenarios are included in the Online
Supplement). Experiment 4 thus utilized a 5 (type of moral
violation) by 2 (potential atheist target vs. potential gay target)
between subjects design.
Participants
Three hundred twenty seven American adults from Mechanical
Turk participated in Experiment 4. The participants represented a
wide variety of religious backgrounds (full demographics for all
experiments are presented in the Online Supplement). As in
Experiments 1–3, I aimed to recruit at least 30 participants per
cell, and deliberately oversampled to meet this goal. All sample
size decisions were made a priori. The final sample sizes across
atheist and gay conditions (respectively) were as follows: Harm (34,
34), Fairness (27, 29), Ingroup (39, 34), Authority (35, 33), and
Purity (30, 37).
Procedure
The general procedure of Experiment 4 was identical to that
used in Experiments 1–3. Experiment 4 did not include an
Instrumental Manipulation Check or distractor syllogisms. Partic-
ipants read one of five descriptions of a moral transgression
(representing violations of each of the five moral foundations).
Then, they received a conjunction question with either a potential
atheist target (referred to as ‘‘an atheist [someone who does not
believe in God]’’) or a potential gay target. Following this
conjunction question, they completed demographics, as in
previous experiments. As in Experiment 1, the career listed for
the villain (i.e., the ‘‘bank teller’’ part of the original Linda
Problem) in Experiment 4 was ‘‘teacher.’’
Results
Participants heuristically judged descriptions of all five types of
moral violations as more representative of people who do not
Table 1. Logistic regression summaries, Experiments 1–3.
OR Low High p
Exp. 1
All 10.98 4.79 25.78 261028
Buddhist 35.89 6.59 672.03 861024
Christian 3.54 1.31 10.28 .015
Hindu 15.11 4.44 70.48 761025
Jewish 40.61 7.48 759.40 561024
Muslim 8.50 2.43 40.31 .002
Exp. 2
All 8.11 3.69 18.20 261027
Buddhist 3.75 1.41 10.72 .01
Christian 18.50 4.72 124.05 261024
Hindu 9.33 2.72 43.78 .001
Jewish 30.00 5.52 561.21 .001
Muslim 5.80 1.96 19.95 .002
Exp. 3
All 7.76 3.52 17.56 561027
Asian 8.37 2.91 27.16 261024
Black 40.71 7.23 768.59 661024
Hispanic 7.24 2.50 23.64 461024
Nat. Am. 5.26 1.92 15.58 .002
White 5.82 2.06 18.01 .001
For each experiment, results from six logistic regression models are presented, comparing (1) the atheist target to all targets (All), followed by (2–6) comparisons of the
atheist target to each other target individually. Odds ratios, as well as upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval of the odds ratio, are presented, along with
p-values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092302.t001
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believe in God than of gay people (see Table 2 for logistic
regression summaries). In sum, across different moral foundations,
participants found descriptions of a moral transgressor to be more
representative of atheists than of gay people. This provides a
critical contrast, as it suggests that it is not mere counter-
normativeness of a group that leads people to intuitively view
immorality as representative of that group.
Although most of these conditions include descriptions of two
moral violations, an additional study presented in the Online
Supplement demonstrates that identical results are evident if the
description only includes one relatively minor moral breach
(cheating at cards once). In sum, the results of the present research
are not attributable to all perpetrators being described as sadistic
(Experiment 1), bizarre (Experiments 2–4), or someone who
repeatedly engages in immoral behavior (Experiment 4). Instead,
even a description of someone cheating at cards one single time is
sufficient to produce the present effects.
Finally, the Online Supplement (Table S2 in File S1) presents
additional analyses showing that, largely consistent with previous
findings in Moral Foundations research [30], political conserva-
tism significantly predicted conjunction error rates in the authority
violation and purity violation conditions for the potential atheist
target.
Experiment 5
Experiments 1–4 revealed that people intuitively assume that
the perpetrators of immoral actions do not believe in God. While
previous large-scale global polls consistently and unequivocally
indicate a perceived link between belief in God and morality [19],
this perception may not neatly map onto the actual mechanisms
linking religion and morality. Specifically, religions furnish people
not only with metaphysical claims about agents present in the
world (e.g., gods), they also provide people with communities,
replete with specific teachings and norms [10,18]. Thus, it may be
that immoral actions are seen as representative of not only people
who do not believe in God (as revealed by previous polls [19] and
Experiments 1–4), but also of people who do not belong to a
religious moral community.
Experiment 5 sought to extend the present findings to consider
the question of whether immorality is viewed as representative of
atheists in part because observers infer that an atheist may not
belong to a moral community. In other words, Experiment 5 tests
the relative contributions of belonging to a religious moral
community and belief in God, respectively, to the present effects.
Experiment 5 utilized a 2 (belief in God: yes vs. no) by 2 (moral
community: member of a church vs. not a member of a church)
between subjects design to directly address the possible contribu-
tions of perceived belongingness to a community for the present
effects.
Participants
One hundred fifty one American adults from Mechanical Turk
participated in Experiment 5 (full demographics for all experi-
ments are presented in File S1). Again, I aimed to recruit at least
30 participants per cell, and deliberately oversampled to meet this
goal. All sample size decisions were made a priori. Four participants
failed an Instrumental Manipulation Check [31] and were
excluded before any analyses were conducted.
Procedure
The general procedure of Experiment 4 was identical to that
used in previous experiments. Participants read the serial killer
description used in Experiment 1 (the villain was called ‘‘a man’’
rather than given a name because throughout Experiments 1–4,
the villain’s name had no discernible effect on the outcomes).
Following this description, participants were asked whether it is
more probable that the character is A) a teacher, or B) a teacher
who XXXXXX, with XXXXXX varied between subjects to
reflect a 2 (belief in God) by 2 (religious moral community)
manipulation. XXXXXX was either ‘‘does not belong to any
church and does not believe in God’’ (N = 43), ‘‘belongs to a
church but does not believe in God’’ (N = 39), ‘‘does not belong to
any church but believes in God’’ (N = 33), or ‘‘belongs to a church
and believes in God’’ (N = 32). This design thus enabled a direct
test of the contributions of belief in God and belonging to a
religious moral community. Following the conjunction task,
participants completed an Instrumental Manipulation Check
[31], as in other studies. Then they recorded only age and gender
as demographics.
Results
To test the relative contributions of belief in God and belonging
in a religious moral community to the present effects, I first
conducted a 2 (belief in God: yes vs. no) by 2 (moral community:
member of a church vs. not a member of a church) binary logistic
regression. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of belief
in God, b = 1.10, se = .56, p = .048, but no main effect of moral
community (b = 2.04, se = .64, p = .95) and no interaction (b = 2
.12, se = .78, p = .88) (Full pattern of results: Atheist, Yes
church = 41% errors; Atheist, No church = 37%; Believer,
Church = 19%; Believer, No church = 18%). Given the lack of a
significant interaction, I performed two separate analyses explor-
ing the effects of belief in God (collapsing across moral community
conditions) and moral community (collapsing across belief in God
Table 2. Logistic regression summaries, Experiment 4.
Atheist Gay OR Low High p
Harm 47.1 14.7 5.16 1.70 18.04 .006
Fairness 33.3 0.0 30.30 3.49 ‘ .02
Ingroup 38.5 14.7 3.63 1.21 12.48 .03
Authority 31.4 6.1 7.10 1.70 48.79 .02
Purity 43.3 0.0 57.86 6.99 ‘ .006
Results from five logistic regression models are presented, comparing the atheist target to the gay target for each Moral Foundation violation. The % of conjunction
errors in atheist and gay conditions, odds ratios, upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval of the odds ratio, and p-values are presented. Note: In the
Fairness and Purity conditions, no participants committed conjunction errors with a potential gay target, rendering traditional logistic regression models impossible.
Instead, bias-reduced GLM analyses were performed using the brglm package in R.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092302.t002
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conditions), respectively. The first analysis revealed that—regard-
less of described belongingness to a religious moral community—
participants judged serial murder as representative of people who
do not believe in God, OR = 2.83, 95% CI: 1.34 to 6.28, p = .008.
In contrast, collapsing across belief in God, not belonging to a
religious moral did not significantly increase conjunction error
rates, OR = .91, 95% CI: .45 to 1.84, p = .78. In sum, when given a
description of someone engaging in immoral behavior, partici-
pants readily and intuitively assume that the villain does not
believe in God, but apparently make no inferences regarding
whether or not the villain is a member of a religious moral
community. While moral communities may be instrumental in any
actual link between religion and moral outcomes [10], moral
communities seem to have little bearing on lay perceptions of such
a link, an interesting divergence discussed in more detail in the
General Discussion.
Aggregate Atheist Analyses
Finally, I investigated atheists’ own intuitive moral perceptions
of atheists. Pooling across experiments for which religiosity data
were collected (Experiments 1–4), I conservatively isolated only
those participants (N = 163) who both self-identified as atheists and
who rated their belief in God at 0. I conducted a logistic regression
model predicting conjunction error rates from potential group
membership (atheist target vs. all other targets). This analysis
revealed that even atheist participants viewed immorality as
significantly more representative of atheists than of other people,
OR = 4.47, 95% CI: 1.62 to 12.66, p = .004. Even atheists seem to
share the intuition that immoral acts are perpetrated by
individuals who don’t believe in God. This suggests an intuitive
association between morality and belief in God is not an
exclusively religious intuition (see Table S3 in File S1 for analyses
testing the moderating effects of participant belief in God across
experiments).
This aggregate analysis is conceptually analogous to performing
a meta-analysis on the atheist participant effects from each study.
However, the aggregate is more efficient and does not require four
separate analyses (one for each study) that are likely each grossly
underpowered. In the reported analysis, I included three dummy
codes for study number, to simultaneously account for between-
study differences. Inferences are identical if these dummies are not
included.
General Discussion
In sum, when reading a description of someone committing an
immoral act, participants readily and intuitively assumed that the
person was an atheist. Combined, these results demonstrate that
Americans (even atheist Americans) intuitively assume that belief
in God somehow inhibits people from engaging in immoral
behavior. Interestingly, Experiment 5 suggests that people are
skeptical of atheist morality specifically because atheists do not
believe in God, not merely because atheists are not members of
religious moral communities. Strikingly, these results were
apparent even among MTurk participants, who tend to be less
religious, on average, than Americans in general (see demograph-
ics presented in File S1). Although the present experiments only
utilized American samples, previous polls [19] indicate that an
association between religious belief and morality is by no means an
exclusively American trend. Nonetheless, future research should
seek to replicate the present studies in diverse populations
worldwide. To this end, an initial pilot cross-cultural investigation
reported in the Online Supplement replicated the effects of
Experiment 1 among participants in India.
Importantly, previous research [23] using the same experimen-
tal procedure demonstrates that these effects do not represent a
general effect whereby any negatively valenced description is
viewed as representative of atheists. The present findings,
combined with previous research using this exact experimental
paradigm [23], instead suggest that it is specifically immoral
negative actions that are seen as representative of atheists,
consistent with other evidence suggesting that many view belief
in God as a prerequisite for morality [19].
Moving Forward
People’s intuitive perceptions of a necessary link between
religion and morality can potentially serve as an interesting
contrast to some recent research demonstrating that moral
judgments draw heavily upon innate intuitive responses. Although
the issue of the degree which morality is innate is far from closed, it
is interesting to speculate about how learning about research
suggesting an innate component of morality might affect
perceptions of atheists. Specifically, it is possible that—regardless
of the degree to which morality actually derives from core
intuitions subsequently elaborated through cultural learning
[34]—participants who read about an innate core foundation of
morality might form different moral perceptions of others. If true,
then exposure to scientific arguments regarding the developmental
[11], phylogenetic [12], or neural [35–36] underpinnings of
common moral intuitions might alleviate morality-driven antipa-
thy towards atheists. Indeed, some popular treatments of this
research [13] explicitly make the point that the research in
question has implications for the role of religion in morality.
These experiments also leave open the question of which aspects
of religious belief people think inhibits immorality. On the one
hand, religious traditions often include explicit teachings regarding
what is permitted and forbidden (e.g., the Ten Commandments,
the Buddhist Noble Eightfold Path). People may intuitively
associate immorality with atheists because of uncertainty regarding
whether or not atheists know which acts are immoral. On the
other hand, it could be that people view atheists as capable of
telling right from wrong, but lacking an external motivational
structure incentivizing morality (e.g., heaven) and disincentivizing
immorality (e.g., hell).
Finally, the present findings may shed light on the psychological
factors that contribute to prevalent prejudice against atheists.
Atheism is a concealable stigma, and atheists do not constitute a
cohesive, coordinated, or conspicuous group; nonetheless they are
among the least accepted people in America [20]. This pattern is
initially puzzling, and makes little sense in the context of many
approaches to prejudice and stereotyping that stress the role of
intergroup dynamics or perceptions of warmth and competence
[21,23]. However, the present studies suggest that inferences made
about individuals, rather than perceptions of group characteristics,
likely underpin anti-atheist prejudice. Atheists’ individual and
collective inconspicuousness may leave people uncertain about
what exactly atheists are like. However, if people readily and
intuitively assume that the perpetrators of immoral acts are
atheists, then this may generate group-level stereotypes of
widespread atheist immorality, leading to distrust [23] and disgust
[25] of atheists.
Religion and Morality: Reality and Perception Revisited
Much ink has been spilled debating the role of religion in
morality. Although current research seems to suggest that at least
some core building blocks of morality do not depend overly much
on religious enculturation [11,12–17], it is likely that a species as
thoroughly cultural as Homo sapiens nonetheless experiences
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elaboration of any innate moral sentiments [11] through cultural
learning. Inasmuch as this is true, religion likely does exert some
influence on morality in at least two ways. First, one mechanism
through which religion may actually influence morality is by the
creation of moral communities [10]. In this sense, individuals will
adopt moral norms from those in their surrounding communities,
via well-elaborated cultural learning processes [37–40]. A second
mechanism linking religion to morality stems from a wealth of
recent research finding that belief in, and reminders of, God can
influence moral outcomes [2–4,8–9]. These two mechanisms are
not mutually exclusive, and likely both operate in concert. Indeed,
the cultural success of many religions likely stems from them doing
many things well, rather than from a single mechanism. Likely,
this is also the case in the moral domain.
While any scientific consensus on the actual relationship
between religion and morality seems likely to be inevitably
complex, nuanced, and multifaceted, the present studies (as well as
previous worldwide polling: [19]) provide initial evidence that lay
perceptions of a religion-morality link focus specifically on belief in
God, rather than community. Across studies, immoral deeds were
heuristically judged as representative of individuals who don’t
believe in God, even though the stimuli gave no specific
information about moral communities. Further, Study 5 directly
tested the contributions of belief in God and belonging to a
religious moral community, and found no support for the
possibility that lay perceptions of a religion-morality link are
consonant with research suggesting a prominent role for commu-
nity [10]. Interestingly, while available evidence suggests promi-
nent roles for both community and faith in shaping moral
outcomes, lay perceptions may overestimate the role of faith while
underestimating the role of community in shaping morality.
Coda
Recently, successful lines of research have emerged, indepen-
dently investigating the evolutionary and cognitive origins and
consequences of both religion [1–2,41–43] and morality [11–
13,29,34–35]. The present paper seeks to integrate these
perspectives by focusing on perceptions of religion’s role in
enabling and facilitating morality. Religions may have been
instrumental in the cultural evolution of large-scale human
cooperation [2] by binding people into moral communities
[10,44]. However, a moral community is defined as much by
those included within it as by those excluded from it. These
experiments reveal one potentially pernicious outcome of this
exclusion: intuitive associations of immorality with disbelief in
God.
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